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Bruce K. Cox

Vice President - Congressional Affairs Federal Government Affairs

FIZZERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

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Suite 1000 1120 20th St., NW Washington, DC 20036 202 457-3686 FAX 202 457-2267

February 25, 1999

Ms. Magalie Roman Salas Secretary Federal Communications Commission 445 Twelfth Street, SW, Room TWB-204 Washington, DC 20554

Re:

Notice of Ex Parte Meeting

In the Matter of Access Charge Reform, CC Docket No. 96-262; Price Cap Performance Review for LECs, CC Docket No 94-1; MCI Telecommunication Corp. Emergency Petition for Prescription, CC Docket No. 97-250; 96-45 Federal State Joint Board on Universal Service; and Consumer Federation of America Petition for Rulemaking, RM-9210

Dear Ms. Roman Salas,

On Wednesday, February 25, 1999, Leonard Cali, Kevin Joseph, Joel Lubin, and I met with Kevin Martin, Legal Advisor to Commissioner Furchtgott-Roth, concerning matters related to the referenced proceedings. We discussed the arguments reflected in AT&T's filings in these proceedings concerning access reform and LEC pricing flexibility. The written presentation used at the meeting is attached.

Two copies of this Notice are being submitted in accordance with Section 1.1203 of the Commission's rules.

Sincerely,
Buck.Cox

Attachment

cc: Kevin Martin



# Local Exchange Carriers Access Charge Reform for

### Access Reform

### AT&T's position...


- \* Competition robust enough to drive down access rates has not developed anywhere in the nation, and the ILECs continue to price at the upper limit in every basket
- The FCC's market-based approach to access reform is not working
- Access charges must be reduced to cost before RBOC 271 entry

# Access Reform Update and Refresh Record

### AT&T's position continued....

- The FCC should prescribe that Access rates be set at Economic Cost using FLEC principles
- The FCC should increase the X-Factor to reflect interstate only data, rather than total company productivity data

# Access Cost By Major Categories -- All Price Cap Companies



#### In Billions (\$) **SLC** \$ 9.1 **CCL** \$ 1.9 **PICC** \$ 1.9 Switched-TS \$ 3.6 Switched-Other \$ 2.1 **Special Access** \$ 4.2 Total All Companies \$22.8

### Price Cap Companies

(Rate of Return by Basket) (1997 - Base Year)

	Common Line Basket	Switching Basket	Trunking Basket	Total
Price Cap LECs	8.88%	45.16%	15.29%*	15.09%*

<sup>\*</sup>If Special Access is removed the Rate of Return would be higher.

### Price Cap Regulation--Reinitialization of Interstate X-Factors

Reinitialize	Current	Reinitialize	Reinitialize	Reinitialize
to:	X=6.50%	to 8.40%	to 9.30%	to 10.20%
<b>July 1998</b>	N/A	(\$442)	(\$651)	(\$860)
July 1997	N/A	(\$886)	(\$1298)	(\$1765)
<b>July 1996</b>	N/A	(\$1320)	(\$1947)	(\$2565)
July 1995	(\$370)	(\$2029)	(\$2952)	(\$3781)

# Impact of Lowering the Switching Basket to a lower Rate of Return is:

## Switching Basket ROR

### Access Reduction

45.16%*	\$0.00
11.25%	\$2.04E
10.00%	\$2.11E
9.50%	\$2.14E

<sup>\*</sup> Equals the Switching Basket ROR for 1997

# Industry Contribution Analysis Non-Rural Only

Contribution from SLC					
Company	1998 Switched Lines (Thousands)	25% of Hatfield Loop & Port	Composite SLC Rate (as of 1-1-99)	Contribution Per Line Per Month (\$)	from SLC  Annualized (\$ Millions)
Total RBOCs	130,779	\$3.19	\$4.86	\$1.67	\$2,616
All Price Caps	162,302	\$3.41	\$4.83	\$1.42	\$2,771

### Industry Contribution Analysis -- Price Cap ILECs Only Contribution from Interstate Switched Access Carrier Rates

E S A	1988 Total Estimated Switched AMOU (Millions)	Switched Access per AMOU		<b>Contribution from Access</b>	
		Economic Cost* (Blended HAI)	ILEC Rates** (as of 1/1/99)	Per Access Minute***	Annualized Total (\$M)***
Total RBOCs	417,014	\$0.00255	\$0.01454	\$0.01199	5,001
Total All Price Cap	510,770	0.00305	0.01586	0.01281	6,545
Plus PICC Charges					1,865
Less USF Flowback					791
Total Contribution	with PICC and	without Flowback			7,619
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Notes:

<sup>\*</sup> HAI Version 5.0a (\*80% Dedicated and 20% Tandem)

<sup>\*\*</sup> Switched Access Unit Cost without PICC Charges and with USF Flowback

<sup>\*\*\*</sup> Includes USF Flowback of \$791 Millions

The ILEC's USF assessment (obligation), should be removed from Interstate Carrier Access charges. This would reduce carrier access charges by over \$800M.

ILECs should recover this obligation directly from their end user (retail) customers.

# Access Reduction Interstate Non-Rural

If the current Mutual Compensation Rates\* are used as a Proxy for Interstate Access Cost/Prices, we estimate this would still produce a reduction of over \$5B in interstate switched access cost.

<sup>\*</sup> Mutual Compensation rates for Ameritech, Bell Atlantic (Excluding Nynex), BellSouth, Pactel are .544¢, .439¢, .412¢, .373¢ per minute, respectively.

### Conclusion...

# There are no implicit subsidies in Interstate Access Charges which support USF for Non-Rural LECs.

#### These monopoly access profits result from:

- 1. Excess earnings measured against their current cost of capital and current investment on the books
- 2. Investment on their current books is overstated based upon recent FCC audits.
- 3. Misallocated costs between regulated versus unregulated services.
- 4. Investments in international ventures
- 5. Misallocation of cost between retail versus carrier to carrier service.
- 6. Excess/Inefficient Plant.